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Announcing the verdict of a trial concerning the execution-style
murder of a California mother of two, the Sacramento Bee recently
reported that the testimony at the trial indicated "that the woman was
killed because she was a witness to another crime."' Unfortunately,
the woman had seen the defendant murder two other people.2 In a
similar situation, an eight-year-old witness to a cult slaying in Texas
was recently murdered due to her knowledge of the crime.'
Prosecutors in the District of Columbia, already struggling with
witness protection problems,4 recently lost several witnesses, including
a corrections officer who was shot to death just days before his
scheduled court appearance, a witness to that officer's murder, and
a witness whose murder caused a mistrial in a drug case.5 The
1. Teen Sentenced in Slayings, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 10, 1993, at B3 (reporting that witness'
body was found in hotel room with killer's two victims).
2. Id. (noting that defendant claimed to have killed two victims because they assaulted his
girlfriend).
3. Thre Members of Sect Acquittedfor Conspiracy, Murderfor Hire, CHI. TRIB.,Jan. 22, 1993, at
4M (reporting that members of religious cult shot eight-year-old girl's father for leaving cult,
then shot girl for witnessing father's death).
4. Jonetta R. Barras, Killing Triggers Stricter Wording in Bail Reform Bill, WASH. TIMES, Feb.
5, 1992, at B3 (quoting D.C. council member as stating that protecting witnesses "is becoming
a very big problem").
5. Id. (discussing D.C. Council's motivation for taking further steps toward preventing
criminal defendants from intimidating or harming adverse witnesses).
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elimination of witnesses through murder6 or intimidation7 has
plagued the criminal justice system in recent decades.'
When a material witness to a crime becomes unavailable, preserva-
tion of the witness' statements for use at trial is critical because the
prosecution of the defendant often will fail without the absent
witness' testimony.9 Admission of such statements, however, presents
a number of problems. Because the witness made the accusation out
of court and the prosecution would be offering it for the truth of the
witness' statement that the defendant is guilty, the statement
constitutes hearsay." Consequently, the statement is inadmissible at
trial unless it falls within certain delineated exceptions to the
hearsay rule.' 2  In addition, defendants in criminal trials have a
right, under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment,"3 to
6. See, e.g., Bill Bryan, Afurder Suspect Facing Charge in Second Killing, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 8, 1993, at 3A (quoting murder investigator as stating, "We had believed the
killing in the park was over a drug dispute, but now we know that the youth was killed because
he had been a witness to [another] murder"); World News Tonight with PeterJennings (ABC
television broadcast, Nov. 24, 1992) (reporting that three teenagers killed boy because he had
witnessed robbery).
7. See, e.g., Richard Seven, Trial Testimony Turns to Victim's Ex-Associate---Bookkeeper Links Rift
to Slaying, SEATL E TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at G3 (describing how witness changed his story
regarding his knowledge of murder after receiving threats of violence from defendant); Larry
Speer, Ventura County News Roundup: Oxnard; Man Charged with Threatening Witness, LA. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 1992, at B2 (discussing intimidation of witness in connection with slayings outside conve-
nience store).
8. SeeMichael H. Graham, Lecture, Witness Intimidation, 12 FLA. ST. U. L REV. 239, 241-42
(1984) (discussing studies of 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s that reported abundance of witness
intimidation that caused witnesses not to testify at trial).
9. See id. at 242 (discussing how witness intimidation has proved fatal to many prosecutions
and defendants' view of intimidation as "innovative defense").
10. See FED. R. EVID. 801 (c) (defining "hearsay" as "a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted"); FED. R. EvID. 801(a) (defining "statement" as "(1) an oral or written
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion");
FED. R EVID. 801 (b) (defining "declarant" as "a person who makes a statement"); see alsoJoAnne
A. Epps, Passing the Confrontation Clause Stop Sign: Is All Hearsay Constitutionally Admissible?, 77 KY.
LJ. 7, 12 (1988-89) (defining "hearsay" as "any out-of-court statement offered for the truth of
its contents").
11. See FED. R. EVID. 802 (stating that hearsay evidence is inadmissible "except as provided
by [the Federal Rules of Evidence] or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court").
12. SeeFED. R. EViD. 804(b) (setting forth exceptions for admitting hearsay from unavailable
witness, which are: (1) former testimony, (2) dying declarations, (3) statements against interest,
(4) statements of personal or family history, and (5) other exceptions); see also Graham, supra
note 8, at 249 (noting that 27 states have addressed admissibility of prior out-of-court statements
by enacting rules of evidence based on Federal Rules). Common-law standards, however, affect
the admissibility of out-of-court statements by witnesses who are unavailable because of the
defendant's misconduct. Graham, supra note 8, at 249. See generally Glen Weissenberger, Federal
Rule of Evidence 804: Admissible Hearsay from an Unavailable Declarant 55 U. CIN. L REV. 1079
(1987) (providing general overview of admission of hearsay evidence).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965) (extending
right of confrontation to state criminal prosecutions under Fourteenth Amendment).
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cross-examine opposing witnesses.1 4 The witness' absence from trial,
therefore, poses a serious constitutional question beyond mere
evidentiary considerations.
Several courts in various state and federal jurisdictions have
struggled with the issue of how to preserve the witness' statements
when the defendant has procured the witness' unavailability. 5
These courts have adhered to a principle that, in situations where a
defendant procures a witness' unavailability, he or she waives the right
to assert a confrontation argument or raise hearsay objections against
admission of that witness' out-of-court statements into evidence.'
6
Based on concerns over truthfulness and accuracy, however, the
courts traditionally limit application of this principle to prior sworn
testimony, such as declarations made during a previous grand jury
appearance. 17 A dilemma arises when the defendant silences an
14. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980) (noting that Confrontation Clause
envisions personal examination and cross-examination of witnesses presented against accused).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1992) (describing
defendant's letters threatening to expose adverse witness' criminal activity if he testified against
defendant); Rice v. Marshall, 709 F.2d 1100, 1101-02 (6th Cir. 1983) (reviewing case where
defendant intimidated witness into silence), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1034 (1984); United States v.
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 627 (5th Cir.) (considering defendant's murder of prosecution witness in
admitting witness' FBI and grandjury testimony), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); United States
v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 626 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding that defendant waived constitutional right
of confrontation by threatening witness' life), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); United States v.
Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1352-60 (8th Cir. 1976) (reviewing threat that caused key witness'
absence and discussing admission of witness' grand jury testimony), crt. denied, 431 U.S. 914
(1977); State v.jarzbeck, 529 A.2d 1245, 1252 (Conn. 1987) (resolving questions that arose after
defendant's threats, made during commission of crime, prevented minor victim from testilying);
State v. Gettings, 769 P.2d 25, 28-29 (Kan. 1989) (discussing admissibility of evidence where
defendant was involved in murder of adverse witness); State v. Olson, 291 N.W.2d 203, 207
(Minn. 1980) (interpreting applicable law when witness refused to testify for fear of defendant's
retribution); State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1343 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (addressing
implications of child abuse victim's inability to testify because of defendant's intimidation);
Holtzman v. Hellenbrand, 460 N.Y.S.2d 591, 597 (App. Div. 1983) (considering government
allegation that defendant induced his wife to refuse to testify at his trial); State v. Carroll, 513
A.2d 1159, 1162 (Vt. 1986) (deciding that absent any effort on defendant's part to intimidate
witness, witness' unavailability was not sufficient to waive Sixth Amendment confrontation
rights).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that, if
defendant waives his Sixth Amendment rights, he waives his hearsay objections as well); Thevis,
665 F.2d at 632-33 (articulating rule that confrontation waiver includes waiver of hearsay
objections); Balano, 618 F.2d at 626 (noting that valid waiver of constitutional confrontation
right also waives objection under rules of evidence); State v. Peirce, 364 N.W.2d 801, 806-07
(Minn. 1985) (implying that confrontation waiver allows admission of hearsay).
17. See, e.g., Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273-74 (concluding that defendant's knowledge of plot
to kill witness and failure to warn appropriate authorities would constitute waiver of
confrontation rights and prior grand jury testimony could be admitted); Thevis, 665 F.2d at 630
(finding defendant waived objection to admission of absent witness' grand jury transcripts by
procuring witness' absence); Balano, 618 F.2d at 626 (rejecting challenge of admission of prior
grand jury testimony where defendant waived confrontation right by threatening witness);
Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1355-60 (admitting absent witness' grand jury testimony where defendant
procured witness' unavailability); United States v. Gallo, 653 F. Supp. 320, 332-33 (E.D.N.Y.
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opposing witness before the witness has provided such testimony."8
This Comment discusses the standards courts apply to the admis-
sion of hearsay evidence when the accused has prevented a witness
from testifying at trial. The central question is whether, and to what
extent, a defendant should forfeit his or her constitutional right to
confront opposing witnesses following such misconduct. Part I
reviews the role of the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule in
the adjudication of unavailable witness cases, focusing on those
situations where the defendant has caused the witness' absence. Part
II explores the different evidentiary burdens courts impose on the
prosecution to prove that a defendant procured the unavailability of
a witness. Part III examines admissibility standards as they apply to an
absent witness' statements following a finding of procurement. Part
IV recommends that Congress amend the Federal Rules of Evidence
to provide a more relaxed approach to admission of statements by
witnesses who cannot appear at trial due to a defendant's conduct.
The Comment concludes that the most equitable response to the
problem of defendant-procured witness unavailability is the complete
abrogation of the defendant's ability to object on confrontation or
hearsay grounds to the admission of any of that witness' out-of-court
statements, including unsworn, ex parte, and extrajudicial declara-
tions.
I. BACKGROUND
The rule against the admission of hearsay evidence and the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
1986) (allowing admission of witness' statements from both grand jury testimony and bail
hearings where defendant procured witness' absence); Peirce, 364 N.W.2d at 807 (affirming
admission into evidence at defendant's trial, testimony given by co-defendant at his trial that
defendant threatened him with harm if he testified); Hellenbrand, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 595-97
(holding that only grand jury testimony is admissible as result of procurement waiver). If the
procuring defendant confronted the absent witness at a previous proceeding, then the witness'
prior testimony may be admissible regardless of a procurement waiver through Federal Rule
804(b) (1):
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former Testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same
or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the
course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is
now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect
examination.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (1).
18. See Graham, supra note 8, at 281-82 (acknowledging admissibility problem and touting
need for special judicial proceedings that occur soon after formal charges in order to qualify
witness' declarations for admission before procurement).
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each present an obstacle to the admission of out-of-court statements
at trial. The U.S. Supreme Court discussed the interplay between the
hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause in Ohio v. Roberts.9
Although the Court determined that the Founders enacted the
Confrontation Clause to exclude some hearsay, it concluded that their
intention could not have been to eradicate the common-law hearsay
exceptions, which the Federal Rules of Evidence subsequently
codified.2" Thus, a court may admit some statements based on
hearsay where the Confrontation Clause bows to competing interests,
such as effective law enforcement.2' Accordingly, when ruling on
the admissibility of a witness' out-of-court statements, a court must
weigh the strength of the Confrontation Clause against other
established policies.22
A. The Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence
Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible at trial.23 Originating
in common law,24 this rule was designed to curb the abuses inherent
in presenting ajury with a witness' prior out-of-court statements where
the accuracy, truth, clarity, and credibility of the statements have not
been tested by cross-examination.' Exceptions to the rule excluding
hearsay, however, developed early in the common law.
26
19. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
20. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (finding that literal reading of Confrontation
Clause would require exclusion of any statement made by nonpresent declarant including long
recognized hearsay exceptions).
21. Id. at 66 (naming development and formulation of rules of evidence for use in criminal
cases as another important interest that may deserve accommodation).
22. See S. Douglas Borisky, Note, Reconciling the Conflict Between the Co-Conspirator Exemption
fim the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1294,
1314 (1985) (proposing that consideration of policies underlying Confrontation Clause and
hearsay exceptions permit admission of trustworthy evidence and encourage accurate verdicts).
23. See FED. R. EvID. 802 (noting that hearsay may be admitted only as provided by rules
of evidence or Supreme Court rulings in accordance with statutory authority or act of Congress).
24. See 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364, at 18 (John H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)
(dating origin of hearsay exclusion to between 1675 and 1690); see also Pickering v. Barkley, 12
Vin. Abr. Evidence 175, 175 (1673) (exemplifying desire to have declarant brought into court
rather than merely presenting declarant's statement); Ireland's Trial, 7 How. St. Tr. 79, 105
(1678) (declaring that certain writing is not admissible unless writer can testify in court); Rutter
v. Hebden, 1 Keb. 754, 754 (1676) (objecting to argument that statement of witness cannot be
admitted unless heard in court).
25. See4J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 800-802 (1979) [hereinafter
WEINSTEIN] (discussing hearsay rule's purpose of creating ideal conditions through witness'
testimony given under oath, in presence ofjury, and subject to cross-examination); Epps, supra
note 10, at 13 (explaining that inability to cross-examine declaring witness originally made
admission of hearsay evidence offensive).
26. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 1397, at 158-59 (citing "dying declaration" as early
example of hearsay exception); see also Woodcock's Case, Leach Cr. C. 500, 501 (4th ed. 1789)
(explaining general principle of "dying declaration" exception in late 18th century). The dying
declaration was one of the earliest hearsay exceptions to develop. SeeEpps, supra note 10, at 14
1000 THE AMERICAN UNvERsrrIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:995
In 1975, Congress officially incorporated the common-law rule
against admission of hearsay evidence into the Federal Rules of
Evidence27 and simultaneously codified many of the common-law
exceptions." Although the rules apply only to federal courts, most
states have patterned their own evidentiary rules after the federal
system.29  The exceptions provide for the admission of hearsay
evidence when a witness made statements under conditions that
denote guarantees of trustworthiness0 and under various circum-
stances where the declarant is unavailable for trial."1 The hearsay
rules do prohibit the proponent of hearsay evidence from using an
unavailability exception to admit the evidence when that party caused
the declarant to be unavailable to testify at trial.12 The rules do not,
however, provide an exception for the admission of prior statements
by a witness whom the defendant has caused to be unavailable to
testify-
3 3
B. The Confrontation Clause
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment,34 like the
& n.26 (noting belief that dying declaration was only established exception to hearsay rule at
time of Sixth Amendment's ratification) (citing F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 22-24, 104
n.6 (1951)). For later cases developing exceptions to the hearsay rule, see Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74,88 (1970) (plurality opinion) (discussing co-conspirator exception); Californiav. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 168 (1970) (discussing prior testimony exception).
27. FED. R. EVID. 802; see Pub. L No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1939 (1975) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. app. at 775 (1988)).
28. FED. R. EvID. 803, 804; see Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1939-43 (1975) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. app. at 776-805 (1988)).
29. Cf. G. LILLY, AN INTRODUMrION TO THE LAw oF EVIDENCE xxv (2d ed. 1987) (noting that
states that have rules of evidence resembling Federal Rules are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
30. See FED. R. EvID. 803 (listing 24 types of statements that rule 803 excepts from hearsay
rule, including "present sense impressions" (803(1)), "excited utterances" (803(2)), "recorded
recollections" (803(5)), "public records" (803(8)), "family records" (803(13)), and "learned
treatises" (803(18))); see also FED R. EvID. 803 advisory committee's notes (stating that
circumstances surrounding making of certain statements provide independent indicia of
trustworthiness for purposes of rule 803 hearsay exceptions).
31. See FED. R. EvID. 804 (providing five situations that constitute unavailability for purposes
of exception to hearsay rule); see also Graham, supra note 8, at 249 (discussing unavailability
exceptions to federal hearsay rule).
32. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (stating that declaring witness is not to be considered
unavailable where proponent of statement procured witness' absence).
33. Id. The reference to procurement of absence is contained within the federal rules'
definition of "unavailability" and is not related to any specific hearsay exception. Id.
34. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... ."); see also Epps, supra note 10, at 17-18
n.44 (noting that 47 states also have constitutional clauses similar or identical to U.S.
Constitution's Confrontation Clause, including Alabama (ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6), Connecticut
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hearsay rule, 5 is designed to protect the right of cross-examina-
tion.' The Confrontation Clause increases the likelihood that an
adverse witness is making a truthful accusation by requiring the
witness to make the accusation in the presence of the defendant.3"
The clause also promotes truthfulness by forcing the witness to make
accusations under oath. 8
The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that the admission of
hearsay evidence does not automatically violate the defendant's right
to confront adverse witnesses.3 9  For example, in Dutton v. Evans,
4
0
the Court allowed a co-conspirator's spontaneous out-of-court
(CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10), Georgia (GA. CONST. art. I, § 1), Iowa (IOWA CONST. art. I, § 10),
Maine (ME. CONST. art. I, § 6), NewJersey (NJ. CONSr. art. 1, 110), Oklahoma (OKLA. CONsr.
art. II, § 20), Rhode Island (R.I. CONsT. art. I, § 10), South Carolina (S.C. CONsr. art. I, § 18),
Texas (TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10), Virginia (VA. CONST. art. I, § 8), and Wyoming (WYO. CONST.
art. I, § 10)); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965) (making right to confront witnesses
applicable to states through Fourteenth Amendment).
35. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990) (recognizing common goal of Confronta-
tion Clause and hearsay rule but noting that Confrontation Clause bars some evidence that is
admissible hearsay); California v. Green, 339 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) (stating that values treated
under hearsay rule and Confrontation Clause are similar but not completely overlapping); see
also United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 632 (5th Cir.) (stating that both Confrontation Clause
and hearsay rule seek testing of evidence through personal confrontation), cert. denied 459 U.S.
825 (1982). Both Green, 399 U.S. at 155, and Wright; 497 U.S. at 814, assert, however, that the
Confrontation Clause is not merely a codification of the hearsay rule. But see Margaret A.
Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint
Mode4 76 MINN. L. REv. 557, 558 (1992) (describing emerging congruence of Confrontation
Clause and hearsay rules); EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, The Constitutionalization of Hearsay: TheExtent
to Which the Fifih and Sixth Amendments Permit or Require the Liberalization of the Hearsay Rules, 76
MINN. L. REv. 521, 525 (1992) (stating that Supreme Court has permitted showing of reliable
hearsay to substitute for right to cross-examine).
36. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (emphasizing that primary interest secured
by Confrontation Clause is right of examination); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (recognizing
cross-examination as essence of right); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965)
(mentioning that underlying rationale for constitutional confrontation is to give criminal
defendant opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses); cf Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S.
237, 242-43 (1895) (noting that confrontation rights allow accused to test adverse witness'
demeanor and credibility).
37. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (discussing qualities of "face to face" confrontation that
promote trustworthiness); Green, 399 U.S. at 157 (discussing value of right to literal confronta-
tion of opposing witnesses); see also 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 25, at 1 800-11 to 800-12 ("The
requirement of personal presence . . . undoubtedly makes it more difficult to lie against
someone, particularly if that person is an accused and present at trial.").
38. See Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (stating that requiring witness to make accusation under oath
is helpful in "impressing [the witness] with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against
the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury"); Wright v. Tatham, 7 Ad. & El. 313 (Ex. Ch.
1837) (rejecting evidence that is not subject to proof "under the sanction of an oath").
39. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970) (holding that co-conspirator's
spontaneous statements against penal interest met hearsay exception, thus admission of
statements did not violate Confrontation Clause); Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43 (finding that
admission of dying declarations under exception to hearsay rule does not violate right of
confrontation); cf United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1137 (4th Cir. 1978) (stating that
Supreme Court has never implied that cross-examination is only means to qualify prior recorded
testimony for admission under Confrontation Clause).
40. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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statements that were against his penal interest to bypass the protec-
don of the Confrontation Clause because they fell within an exception
to the hearsay rule.41 Similarly, in Mattox v. United States,42 the
Court held that another hearsay exception, the dying declaration
exception, did not violate a defendant's confrontation rights.4' In
fact, any hearsay evidence that falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception 4 will satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation
Clause.4' Additionally, hearsay evidence that falls within a hearsay
exception that is not firmly rooted will satisfy the Confrontation
Clause if it has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 6 The
constitutional right to cross-examine an opposing witness, therefore,
41. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970) (noting that reliability of co-conspirator's
statements was strengthened because they expressed no assertion about past fact, and were
corroborated by other testimony).
42. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
43. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
44. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (defining firmly rooted hearsay exceptions
as those that "rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within
them comports with the 'substance of the constitutional protection'") (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S.
at 244).
45. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 743 (1992) (holding that Confrontation Clause is
satisfied where proffered hearsay is of sufficient reliability to come within firmly rooted
exception to hearsay rule); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990) (agreeing thatjudicial and
legislative assessments have found indicia of reliability in firmly rooted exceptions sufficient to
satisfy Confrontation Clause); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (asserting that
co-conspirator exception to hearsay rule is firmly rooted hearsay exception and that no
independent inquiries into reliability of evidence are required); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (affirming
that firmly rooted hearsay exceptions carry indicia of reliability that satisfy requirements of
Confrontation Clause); Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43 (recognizing that dying declarations are
deeply rooted hearsay exception and are admissible notwithstanding Confrontation Clause).
46. See Wright 497 U.S. at 816 (discussing ways in which hearsay statements can be
sufficiently reliable to merit admission); Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183-84 (mentioning that
independent inquiry into reliability is necessary to admit statements not within firmly rooted
exception); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (holding that reliable hearsay is admissible without use of
firmly rooted exception).
Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b) (5) provide for the admission of reliable
hearsay that does not meet a firmly rooted exception. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b) (5). The
texts of the two rules are identical, but the latter rule is specifically applicable to declarations
of absent witnesses:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence.
FED. I EVID. 804(b) (5). This rule, sometimes referred to as a "catchall" hearsay exception, has
received criticism for allowing the admission of untrustworthy statements. See generally Myrna
S. Raeder, The Effect of the Catchalls on Criminal Defendants: Little Red Riding Hood Meets the Hearsay
Wolf and Is Devoured, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 925 (1992) (reviewing impact of rule 804(b) (5)).
1994] DEFENDANT-PROCURED WITNESS UNAVAILABILITY 1003
does not require complete exclusion of all out-of-court statements
made by an absent witness.
C. Waiving the Right of Confrontation and Objections to Hearsay
Evidence
Despite the protection that the Confrontation Clause provides for
defendants, courts can find that the defendant waived his or her right
to cross-examine an opposing witness at trial.4' A defendant can
make such a waiver voluntarily.' To do so, he or she ordinarily
would have to make "an intentional relinquishment of a known right
or privilege."49 A defendant waives his or her confrontation rights,
for example, when the defendant pleads guilty.5"
An implied waiver of confrontation rights is also possible. In Taylor
v. United States,5" the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant who is
voluntarily absent from trial indirectly waives the right to confront
witnesses.52 Similarly, in Illinois v. Allen, 3 the Court held that a
defendant who is removed from the courtroom for engaging in
"speech and conduct which is so noisy, disorderly, and disruptive that
it is exceedingly difficult or wholly impossible to carry on the trial"
effectively waives the right of confrontation. 4 Whatever the reason
for the waiver, the Supreme Court has stressed that because
confrontation is a right personal to the accused, the accused must
47. See e.g., Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 17-18 (1973) (refusing to recognize
defense argument that defendant's voluntary absence from trial violated his Sixth Amendment
right to confront witnesses testifying during his absence); Illinois v. Allen, 897 U.S. 337, 346-47
(1970) (holding that right of confrontation is not absolute).
48. See, e.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (noting that in order to establish
effective waiver of confrontation rights, prosecution must establish that accused intentionally
relinquished his or her right); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (recognizing that
defendants can voluntarily relinquish confrontation rights); see also 5 WIGMORE, supra note 24,
§ 1398, at 142-43 (discussing ability of accused to waive right of confrontation).
49. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (recognizing that courts "indulge every reasonable presumption
against [a constitutional] waiver") (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393
(1937)).
50. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 240-41 (1969) (noting that to act as waiver of
confrontation rights, accused must "intelligently and knowingly plead guilty"); see also United
States v. Stephens, 609 F.2d 230, 282 (5th Cir. 1980) (affirming that stipulating to evidence
expressly waives right to confront witness who brings it); United States v. Martin, 489 F.2d 674,
678 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding that attorneys' stipulation to evidence on defendant's behalf was
valid waiver of defendant's confrontation rights), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 948 (1974).
51. 414 U.S. 17 (1973).
52. Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973) (finding that petitioner, who had duty
to appear and who attended opening session of trial, was unlikely to harbor any doubts about
his right to be present at trial).
53. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
54. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970).
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personally waive the right."
The Supreme Court has held that a defendant who procures a
witness' unavailability at trial waives his or her confrontation rights.'
The Court has viewed such a procurement of absenteeism as a much
more direct kind of waiver than other instances of misconduct
because it involves the witness' actual ability to appear for confronta-
tion.5  Compared to other kinds of confrontation waivers, which
involve a defendant's relinquishment only of the right to be present
while an attorney cross-examines the opposing witness,5 8 a procure-
ment waiver is unique in that the witness is not available to answer the
attorney's questions.59 Several courts have held that a rule prevent-
ing defendants from asserting their right to confront witnesses after
they personally have secured the witness' unavailability is necessary to
55. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975) (emphasizing that counsel is
present only to assist accused in his or her defense and cannot waive constitutional rights on
accused's behalf). But see United States v. Martin, 489 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding
attorney's stipulation to evidence on defendant's behalf was valid waiver of defendant's
confrontation right where defendant was present when agreement was reached but did not make
his reservations known at that time), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 948 (1974).
56. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1878). More recent federal and state
court opinions have perpetuated the rule that a defendant waives confrontation rights when he
or she procures a witness' absence. See, e.g., Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1203-04 (6th Cir.
1982) (finding that defendant's use of force, threats, persuasion, control, and direction
regarding witness' testimony constituted instances of waiver-inducing wrongful conduct), cert.
denied sub nom. Kilbane v. Marshall, 460 U.S. 1053 (1983); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616,
633 (5th Cir.) (finding that defendant waived confrontation rights when he murdered witness
prior to trial), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th
Cir. 1979) (finding waiver of confrontation rights where defendant's intimidation resulted in
witness' absence from trial), cert. deni, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d
1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding that defendant's threats, which resulted in witness' absence
from trial, constituted waiver of confrontation rights), cert. denied 431 U.S. 914 (1977); State v.
Gettings, 769 P.2d 25, 29 (Kan. 1989) (finding that defendant waived confrontation rights by
being involved in pretrial murder ofwitness); State v. Olson, 291 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Minn. 1980)
(finding waiver where witness feared retribution and therefore did not testify after receiving
threats from defendant).
57. In Reynolds, the Court stated:
The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should be
confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by [the
defendant's] own wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence
is admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept away. The Constitution does
not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own
wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses
against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his
privilege. If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is supplied in
some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been
violated.
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158.
58. See Carlson, 547 F.2d at 1358 n.II (noting that in Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17
(1973), and Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), defendants lost right to personally confront
witnesses but maintained right to confront witnesses through counsel even after waiver of
confrontation rights).
59. Id.
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sustain "the very system of justice the confrontation clause was
designed to protect."' The resulting court-imposed waiver is rooted
in the common-law principle that one should not benefit from his or
her own wrongdoing." Under the same rationale, courts have found
that a confrontation waiver is a fortiori a waiver of the defendant's
right to assert hearsay objections.62
The Fifth Circuit found the existence of such waivers in United States
v. Thevis.65 In Thevis, the defendant, while in prison awaiting trial,
confessed to murdering an adverse witness a few days before the
witness was to enter a witness-protection program." The court held
that, through his actions, the defendant waived his right to confront
the witness along with his hearsay objections, and admitted the
witness' prior grand jury testimony.'
Similarly, in United States v. Mastrangelo,' the defendant argued on
appeal that admission of prior grand jury testimony given by an
unavailable witness was inadmissible hearsay and violated his confron-
tation right.67 The defendant was appealing the lower court's
decision to admit prior grand jury testimony given by an unavailable
witness based on the court's belief that the defendant "either directly
arranged for the killing of the witness or was advised of the possible
60. See United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming that
defendant's involvement in murder ofwitness would preclude assertion of confrontation rights);
see also Balano, 618 F.2d at 629 (stating that permitting defendant to benefit by procuring
witness' absence would contravene purpose of Confrontation Clause, public policy, and common
sense); Carson, 547 F.2d at 1359 (noting that Sixth Amendment confrontation right is not
absolute in situations of defendant misconduct); cf. Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th
Cir. 1982) (discussing law's preference for live testimony over hearsay, and emphasizing that
defendant cannot take advantage of that preference by making preferred condition impossible).
61. Balano, 618 F.2d at 629 (establishing roots of procurement waiver in common-law
doctrine); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 1405(4) (relating long-standing interest in preventing
defendants from judicially profiting through wrongful acts); see Kenneth Graham, The Right of
Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 139
(1972) (asserting that defendant who is responsible for murdering hostile witness should be
prevented from using right of confrontation as means of blocking that witness' statements in
court).
62. See supra note 16 (listing cases that have abrogated defendant's ability to raise hearsay
objection after finding waiver of confrontation rights).
63. 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
64. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 624 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
The defendant originally was charged with violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). Thevis, 665 F.2d at 621.
65. Thevit, 665 F.2d at 632-33.
66. 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982).
67. United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 270 (2d Cir. 1982) (indicating that
defendant was appealing his conviction on various drug charges). The witness in this case was
chased, shot, and killed by two men on the street while on his way to the defendant's trial. Id.
at 271 (relating appellate court's prior decision that defendant was only possible beneficiary of
witness' murder).
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killing of the witness and acquiesced."68 The Second Circuit agreed
with the trial court, stating that if the trial court's impression was
correct, the defendant had waived his admissibility objections.69 The
court then remanded the case for a full evidentiary hearing on the
issue of the defendant's involvement in the witness' death.7
In State v. Corrigan,71 a defendant repeatedly threatened an
opposing witness, who was also his wife, until she repudiated sworn
statements she had made accusing the defendant of arson.2  The
Kansas Court of Appeals reviewed evidence that the defendant first
urged the witness to remain silent, then threatened to take the
witness' newborn baby away and have the witness committed to a
mental institution if she testified against him.73 Finding the evidence
compelling, the court ruled that the defendant wrongfully prevented
the witness from testifying against him and therefore could not object
to admission of her hearsay statements.74
The right to raise confrontation and hearsay objections are
important truthfinding mechanisms for courts to apply in the interest
of justice.75 Nevertheless, both mechanisms clearly may yield to
stronger state interests and public policy considerations.76  The
Supreme Court has asserted that a defendant can waive these rights
through misconduct as well as by consent.77 A waiver by misconduct
68. Id.
69. Id. at 273-74 (stating that knowledge of plan to kill witness is sufficient to constitute
waiver of confrontation rights).
70. Id. at 272. At Mastrangelo's second trial for drug trafficking, the court did not reach
the defendant-procurement issue because it found that the prior testimony was reliable enough
to overcome the defendant's objections under an exception to the hearsay rule. United States
v. Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389, 390-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting that trial court perceived
statements to be surrounded by particularized guarantees of trustworthiness and admitted them
under residual hearsay exception provided in rule 804(b) (5)).
71. 691 P.2d 1311 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984).
72. State v. Corrigan, 691 P.2d 1311, 1315-16 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (addressing admissibility
of statements witness made to fire investigators).
73. See id. (mentioning that defendant informed witness that if she testified, she and her
child "would have to survive on welfare").
74. Id. at 1316.
75. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 24, at § 1395 (discussing common-law sanctioning of
defendant's confrontation right and noting that main purposes of right are to provide
opportunity for cross-examination and to allow judge and jury to view witness' demeanor while
testifying).
76. See supra notes 51-75 and accompanying text (describing conditions under which courts
have overruled confrontation rights and hearsay objections).
77. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (stating that interfering with trial
through wrongful conduct will abrogate accused's confrontation right); Snyderv. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (holding that in certain situations, defendant's wrongful conduct can
constitute confrontation waiver), overruled on othergrounds byMalloyv. Hogan, 370 U.S. 1 (1969);
Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 458 (1912) (asserting that law does not allow persons to
profit from their own misconduct); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878)
(expressing logic in revoking right of confrontation where defendant misconduct is involved),
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exists if the prosecution can show that a defendant procured a




For a court to find a waiver of the right to raise hearsay objections
and the Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses, the
government first must prove that the defendant did procure the
witness' absence. 9 Jurisdictions have split, however, on the eviden-
tiary standard required to prove that the defendant was at fault.80
overruled on othergrounds by Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981);
see also Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1200-01 (6th Cir. 1982) (identifying forms of misconduct
that constitute confrontation waiver), cert. denied sub nom. Kilbane v. Marshall, 460 U.S. 1053
(1983).
78. See United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629-30 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that
defendant's role in intimidation of witness was sufficient to constitute waiver of confrontation
rights); State v. Corrigan, 691 P.2d 1311, 1316 (Kan. C. App. 1984) (finding defendant's
attempts to intimidate witness constituted procurement and prohibited defendant from raising
confrontation objections).
79. See United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that burden
of proof in procurement-waiver cases is clearly on government); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d
616, 633 n.17 (5th Cir.) (listing elements government must show to prove procurement waiver),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); Stee/ 684 F.2d at 1202 (stating that proponent of hearsay must
prove procurement); Holtzman v. Hellenbrand, 460 N.Y.S.2d 591, 597 (App. Div. 1983)
(delegating responsibility of proving procurement to prosecution).
In at least one case, the action of the defendant was not the focus of the government's
burden. In State v. Olson, the Minnesota Supreme Court imputed a convicted felon's
intimidation of a witness, which caused the witness' absence from another defendant's trial, to
the defendant "insofar as he was acting as [the felon's] co-conspirator." State v. Olson, 291
N.W.2d 203, 208 (Minn. 1980). Accordingly, the court found that the defendant had waived his
confrontation rights just as if he had procured the witness' absence directly. Id. But cf. Motes
v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900) (holding that waiver of confrontation rights was not
applicable to defendants where reason for witness' unavailability arose from federal authorities'
negligence); State v. Lomax, 608 P.2d 959, 967 (Kan. 1980) (rejecting waiver theory where
threats did not come from defendant); State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96, 105 (Minn. 1981)
(stating that "[t]o find a waiver based on a witness' reluctance to testify, absent any threats
attributable to defendant," would destroy principles of Sixth Amendment) (emphasis added);
Regina v. Scaife, 117 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1273 (1851) (ruling unanimously that government could
use absent witness' statements only against defendant who caused absence, not against
codefendant who took no part in misconduct and remanding for jury to consider witness'
evidence only against procuring defendant).
Surprisingly, very few courts have held that the government has the burden of proving that
the procuring defendant was acting specifically to prevent the witness from testifying. See Thevis,
665 F.2d at 633 n.17 (holding that government must show defendant caused witness'
unavailability for purpose of preventing that witness from testifying at trial).
80. Compare Thevis, 665 F.2d at 631 (requiring clear and convincing evidence of defendant's
involvement in causing unavailability of witness) and Hellenband, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 597 (requiring
that prosecution prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant procured witness'
absence) with Balano, 618 F.2d at 629 (holding that courts must find by preponderance of
evidence that defendant's conduct caused witness to be unavailable) and State v. Sheppard, 484
A.2d 1330, 1348 (N.J. Super. C. Law Div. 1984) (allowing preponderance of evidence standard
in cases of waiver by misconduct).
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Most courts choose8 l either the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard or the stricter "clear and convincing evidence" standard for
proving procurement.82 Preliminary suppression hearings are often
the prosecutor's forum for proving procurement.13 An evaluation of
Supreme Court opinions regarding preliminary suppression hearings
indicates that the Court has required clear and convincing evidence
in some cases84 and has accepted proof by a preponderance of the
evidence" in others. Thus, the Court has not provided the lower
courts with a uniform standard of proof to apply in defendant
procurement-waiver cases.8 6
Opinions advocating use of the clear and convincing evidence
standard for the purpose of proving procurement maintain that
because the reliability of the absent witness' out-of-court statements
is uncertain,87 the defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses is
crucial in order to ferret-out unreliable statements. 88 The right to
confront adverse witnesses through cross-examination is "so integral
81. Both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the common law provide judges with the
discretion to make determinations regarding the admissibility of evidence in preliminary
hearings. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (stating thatjudges are "not bound by the rules of evidence"
when ruling on admissibility of evidence in preliminary hearings); Bourjaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171, 181 (1987) (noting thatjudge has discretion to make admissibility determinations);
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 175 (1971) (stating thatjudge should receive evidence
and assign weight based on judgment and experience); Steele, 684 F.2d at 1202 (describing
common-law procedure of granting trial judges discretion in making preliminary evidentiary
findings and reflection of this procedure in federal rules).
82. See supra note 80 (listing examples of courts that have chosen between standards); see
also Steele 684 F.2d at 1202 (stating that federal courts have imposed less stringent standards,
usually choosing between preponderance and clear and convincing standards, for proving
procurement).
83. See Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273 (agreeing with defendant's assessment of need for
evidentiary hearing on issue of waived confrontation rights and holding that government must
bear burden of proof in proving procurement); Balano, 618 F.2d at 629 (discussing
government's need to show through hearing defendant's alleged procurement); State v.
Gettings, 769 P.2d 25, 30-31 (Kan. 1989) (stating pretrial hearing steps taken by government to
admit taped conversation to prove defendant procurement); cf. Hellenbrand, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 597
(listing procedural steps for procurement-waiver cases).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967) (requiring clear and
convincing evidence standard where reliability of evidence is in question).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177-78 (1974) (allowing preponderance
of evidence standard where constitutionality of search is in question); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S.
477, 489 (1972) (accepting preponderance of evidence standard where voluntariness of
defendant's confession is in question).
86. See Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273 (discussing varied burden of proof standards in Supreme
Court precedent).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir.) (justifying use of clear and
convincing evidence test by stressing its truth-seeking quality), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982);
Hellenbrand, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 597 n.2 (basing choice of clear and convincing evidence test on state
legislature's aversion to hearsay evidence).
88. See Thevis, 665 F.2d at 631 (basing choice of clear and convincing evidence standard on
Supreme Court's emphasis on protection of confrontation rights); see also supra note 36 (relating
importance that Supreme Court places on right to cross-examine).
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to the accuracy of the fact-finding process and the search for truth"89
that a waiver of the right to cross-examine should be found only after
the government has met a rigid burden of proof. °
The rationale supporting the use of the less stringent preponder-
ance of the evidence standard9 stresses the role of the defendant's
own misconduct in creating the problem.92 The courts that employ
this standard recognize that applying a higher standard could
encourage defendants to silence adverse witnesses because the
chances of benefiting from such an act improve as the chances that
the prosecution will prove the act deteriorate.93 These courts
maintain that the prosecution's burden does not need to be severe
because the prosecution's claim of a procurement waiver by a
defendant often contains "tangible support,"" such as the untimely
murder of a key witness.9" Furthermore, the federal rule of evidence
that addresses admissibility determinations regarding preliminary
factual issues" only requires the court to apply the preponderance
89. Thevis, 665 F.2d at 631.
90. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (noting that absence of confrontation casts
doubt on integrity of fact-finding process during trial); cf. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 1367
(describing cross-examination as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the
truth").
91. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (stating that preponderance standard
means that courts must find it more probable than not that "technical issues and policy concerns
addressed by the Federal Rules of Evidence have been afforded due consideration" before
admitting evidence). In Steele v. Taylor, the court described the use of the preponderance of the
evidence standard in procurement-waiver cases as follows:
[T]he proponent of the hearsay statement has the burden of persuasion of showing
procurement by a preponderance, but once evidence is produced that demonstrates
good reason to believe the defendant has interfered with the witness, adverse
inferences may be drawn from the failure of the defense to offer credible evidence to
the contrary.
Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Kilbane v. Marshall,
460 U.S. 1053 (1983).
92. See; e.g., United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982) (refusing to
impose on government more than its usual burden of proof by preponderance of evidence
where waiver by defendant's own misconduct is present); State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1348
(NJ. Super. CL Law Div. 1984) (noting that issue of waiver by misconduct is distinct from right
of confrontation and supports use of preponderance of evidence as standard for proving
procurement); State v. Frambs, 460 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Wis. CL App. 1990) (advancing
preponderance of evidence standard, in light of Mast-angelo and Balano decisions, as correct
standard to apply toward proving confrontation waiver by misconduct).
93. See Mastrangelo. 693 F.2d at 273 (asserting that little reason exists to "encourage behavior
which strikes at the heart of the system of justice itself'); Steel, 684 F.2d at 1202 (stating that
purpose of waiver rule is to remove strong incentives to silence opposing witnesses).
94. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273.
95. Id. According to the court in Mastrangelo, the use by many courts of a less rigid burden
reflects the fact that the law is not particularly adverse to government claims of confrontation
waiver and that such claims are usually trustworthy. Id. (citing CHARLES T. MCCORMICK,
MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 340 (2d ed. 1972)).
96. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (stating in relevant part that courts are not bound by Federal Rules
of Evidence in determining admissibility of evidence in preliminary proceedings).
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of the evidence standard.97 The Supreme Court has stated that
these admissibility determinations with respect to the finding of
preliminary facts have been reliable without the use of a higher
standard." Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence
standard is the more appropriate test for use in procurement-waiver
cases.
Although some courts have entertained the thought of using other
evidentiary standards in these cases, such as a prima facie standard,"
a floating standard to be determined on a case-by-case basis,'0° or
a "reasonable doubt" standard,1"' adoption of these standards has
not followed. One might argue that the government should have to
prove procurement beyond a reasonable doubt because a court would
require such proof for a jury to return a guilty verdict on a federal
charge of witness tampering."2 This argument, however, fails to
note the distinction between procurement as a substantive crime and
procurement as an evidentiary principle.03 Procurement in the
context of substantive criminal law is the crime of witness tampering
and is subject to all the provisions and limitations statutorily imposed
97. See Boujaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987) (stating that preponderance of
evidence standard is traditional requirement "regarding admissibility determinations that hinge
on preliminary factual questions"); see also Steele, 684 F.2d at 1203 (noting that preliminary
admissibility questions under co-conspirator exception to hearsay rule, identical to those under
Confrontation Clause, involve use of preponderance of evidence standard).
98. Bouraily, 483 U.S. at 175-76. In Boujaily, the Court noted that parties offering evidence
regarding disputed facts relevant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (2) (E) (i.e., co-conspirator
admissions) need only meet a preponderance standard. Id. at 176.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979) (stating that prima
faciestandard is too low and would "emasculate the Confrontation Clause"), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
840 (1980).
100. See State v. Corrigan, 691 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (declining to choose
standard for finding procurements because evidence met both preponderance and clear and
convincing tests); State v. Peirce, 364 N.W.2d 801, 807 (Minn. 1985) (rejecting use of specific
standard and instead accepting proof of procurement based on government's performance in
that particular case).
101. See Balano, 618 F.2d at 629 (depicting reasonable doubt standard as capable of
preventing successful proof of waiver despite outrageous defendant misconduct).
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (codifying crime of witness tampering).
103. Cf United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 549 (7th Cir. 1979) (drawing substantive
evidentiary distinction between crime of conspiracy and co-conspirator hearsay exception). The
court in Gil held that where a defendant is acquitted on a conspiracy charge, his or her
statements can still meet the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule even though
involvement in a conspiracy is an element of the exception. Id.; see also United States v. Trowery,
542 F.2d 623, 626 (3d Cir. 1976) (distinguishing evidentiary co-conspirator rule and substantive
crime of conspiracy).
No court addressing the evidentiary issue of procurement waiver has incorporated a witness-
tampering analysis into its discussion. Cf United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1992)
(determining validity of witness-tampering conviction only after completion of procurement-
waiver holding).
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by Congress. 10 4  Procurement in the context of a "procurement
waiver," however, is merely an element of a rule of evidence designed
to combat defendant misconduct based on the concept that the law
should not allow litigants to benefit from their own wrongdoing.
10 5
Although the allegations for each inevitably will be similar, the
adjudication of a substantive witness-tampering charge is distinct from
the establishment of a procurement waiver.
10 6
The selection of an evidentiary standard for proving procurement
thus involves balancing the defendant's confrontation rights against
the interest of law enforcement. 7 The balance necessarily falls
away from a heavy burden because such a burden would encourage
defendants to take advantage of the Confrontation Clause by forcing
adverse witnesses to be unavailable for trial. Accordingly, the law
should require the accused to relinquish his or her confrontation
right pursuant to a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
the accused procured the unavailability of a witness.
III. WHICH STATEMENTS BECOME ADMISSIBLE?
Whatever the prosecution's burden of persuasion for proving a
waiver may be, and assuming that the prosecutor meets it, the
admissibility of the absent witness' out-of-court statements may still be
at issue. Traditionally, the only type of hearsay statements that are
admissible following a finding of procurement have been sworn
declarations that the witness made at previous judicial proceed-
ings." Consequently, a prosecutor, whose key witness fell silent
before attending such a proceeding, has little precedent under which
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (listing elements of witness-tampering charge, including criminal
intent and unlawful action).
105. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (describing rationale of procurement-
waiver rule).
106. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987) (differentiating between
admissibility determinations and substantive issues). The Court in Bounaily stated:
We have traditionally required that [preliminary factual issues regarding admissibility
determinations] be established by a preponderance of proof. Evidence is placed
before the jury when it satisfies the technical requirements of the evidentiary Rules,
which embody certain legal and policy determinations. The inquiry made by a court
concerned with these matters is not whether the proponent of the evidence wins or
loses his case on the merits, but whether the evidentiary rules have been satisfied.
Thus, the evidentiary standard is unrelated to the burden of proof on the substantive
issues ....
Id.
107. Cf. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (stating that government interest in law
enforcement "may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial"). See generally CHARLES T.
McCoRMIcK, McCoRMiCK's HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 252-253 (4th ed. 1992)
(outlining balancing tests used by Supreme Court with respect to confrontation right).
108. See supra note 17 (citing cases in which courts have admitted only prior testimony in
procurement-waiver cases).
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to admit the witness' out-of-court statements.
A. The Focus on Prior Sworn Testimony
Because courts have held that a proven waiver of confrontation
rights is a fortiori a waiver of the right to raise hearsay objections
regarding the unavailable witness' statements,1°9 courts have also
dispensed with the reliability requirements that they typically demand
of hearsay statements absent a confrontation waiver 1 The parame-
ters of the waiver are more limited than they first appear, however,
because most cases applying the "afortiori" rule exclusively concern
the absent witness' prior testimony."i
The focus on sworn statements, such as those made in a grand jury
proceeding," 2 correlates to the reliability inquiry that some courts
have implemented toward the absent witness' statements to counter-
balance the defendant's waiver of confrontation rights.13 Courts
typically require either a traditional hearsay exception" 4 or other
109. See, e.g., United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1982); United States
v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); United States v. Balano,
618 F.2d 624, 626 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); State v. Corrigan, 691 P.2d
1311, 1314 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984).
110. See, e.g., Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272 (indicating that trustworthiness test of Federal
Rules of Evidence does not apply where confrontation waiver is established); Balano, 618 F.2d
at 626 (implying that reliability determination required by Federal Rules of Evidence is not
necessary when valid waiver exists); State v. Gettings, 769 P.2d 25, 30 (Kan. 1989) (noting that
strict reliability standards are not required where defendant has waived confrontation right);
Peirce, 364 N.W.2d 801, 807 (Minn. 1985) (refusing to decide on reliability issue due to finding
of procurement).
111. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (listing cases that have applied waiver rule only
to admission of prior testimony).
112. In United States v. Balano, the Tenth Circuit questioned the trustworthiness of grandjury
testimony- "In characterizing grand jury testimony for Confrontation Clause purposes, we
should recognize that grand juries have largely lost their function as protectors of individual
rights and have become agents of the prosecution." Balano, 618 F.2d at 627 n.5 (citing MARVIN
E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFrAuS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTIrUTION ON TRIAL 99-102 (1977));
see also United States v. Guinan, 836 F.2d 350, 357-58 (7th Cir. 1988) (allowing testimony that
IRS agent had written and estranged wife read verbatim during husband's grand jury hearing);
Berger, supra note 35, at 610 (noting that prosecutors elicit and often prepare grand jury
testimony).
113. See Thevis, 665 F.2d at 633 n.17 (stating that despite government's proof of procure-
ment, statements should still be scrutinized by court for reliability before admission); Steele v.
Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1204 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating that although prosecution had established
procurement, statements in question had additional earmarks of reliability because they were
signed and made voluntarily), cert. denied sub nom. Kilbane v. Marshall, 460 U.S. 1053 (1983);
State v. Gettings, 769 P.2d 25, 29-30 (Kan. 1989) (conducting reliability discussion after finding
of waiver); Peirce, 364 N.W.2d at 807 (mentioning that absent witness' prior testimony was not
subject to cross-examination, but was consistent with prior statements); State v. Sheppard, 484
A.2d 1330, 1348-49 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (relying on truthful nature of videotaped
statements).
114. See, e.g., Black v. Woods, 651 F.2d 528, 531 (8th Cir.) (mentioning that unavailable
witness' statement previously met "admissions against penal interest" hearsay exception), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 847 (1981); Gettings, 769 P.2d at 30 (asserting that absent witness' statement
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indicia of reliability,"' as required by the Supreme Court regarding
hearsay from a generally unavailable declarant,"' in order to justify
evidentiary admissions following findings of procurement. The
infrequency with which courts find a procurement waiver and admit
statements other than prior sworn testimony, together with the
additional reliability findings that most courts require to admit
hearsay evidence,"' erects a barrier against the admission of any
unsworn, ex parte, or extrajudicial statements," 8 regardless of the
existence of a confrontation waiver.
When a court places emphasis on reliability considerations in a
procurement-waiver case, however, the court fails to take the
defendant's subversive misconduct sufficiently into account. As the
court in Thevis stated, "when confrontation becomes impossible due
to the actions of the very person who would assert the right, logic
dictates that the right has been waived.""' Extending that logic,
if hearsay objections truly were afortioriwaived, a procuring defendant
essentially has removed his or her own protection against unreliable
statements.1 20  Of course, allowing a jury to hear a statement that is
both totally uncorroborated and unreliable on its face would bring
the integrity of the judicial process into question.1
2'
Nevertheless, to require more than minimal indicia of reliability
qualified as "statement against penal interest" hearsay exception). See also FED. R. EVID.
804(b) (3) (articulating "statements against interest" exception to hearsay rule).
115. See, e.g., Rice v. Marshall, 709 F.2d 1100, 1104 (6th Cir. 1983) (explaining in indicia of
reliability analysis that absent witness' statement was signed and voluntarily made and therefore
admissible in procurement-waiver case), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1034 (1984); Steele 684 F.2d at 1204
(holding that absent witness' statements pass "indicia of reliability" test because theywere written
statements that witness signed and made voluntarily); Peirce, 364 N.W.2d at 807 (noting reliability
of absent witness' statements by mentioning their consistency with witness' prior statements);
Sheppard, 484 A.2d at 1348 (relying heavily, for admission purposes, on reliable nature of
videotaped statement).
116. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (requiring that statements admitted over
hearsay objections have "indicia of reliability").
117. General concern for the reliability of hearsay evidence suggests that such findings are
indeed necessary. See Berger, supra note 35, at 613 (opining that curtailment of confrontation
contravenes Sixth Amendment by preventing prosecution's effect on witness' hearsay evidence
from being sufficiently examined by jury); Epps, supra note 10, at 16-17 (criticizing admission
of hearsay without concern for reliability); Graham, supra note 8, at 281 (relating need for
proceedings where only trustworthy out-of-court statements are admitted after procurement
waiver). But see supra note 110 (citing cases that concluded reliability determinations are
unnecessary after procurement waiver).
118. SeeState v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96, 103 (Minn. 1981) (discussing traditional belief that
ex parte statements made during police questioning are inherently unreliable).
119. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir.), cert. deniea 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
120. But see United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992) (suggesting that due
process protects defendants from unavailable hearsay even after procurement).
121. See Agular, 975 F.2d at 47 (stating that facially unreliable hearsay is inadmissible because
probative value does not outweigh prejudicial effect); Thevis, 665 F.2d at 633 n.17 (noting that
admission of totally unreliable evidence may violate due process).
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would effectively grant the procuring defendant a reprieve by
restoring the same rights that the waiver logically precludes.
Moreover, it would suggest that the defendant assumes no evidentiary
risk in wrongfully disposing of a declarant of unsworn, ex parte,
extrajudicial statements. Such a scheme can only strengthen
incentive for criminal defendants to quickly secure the unavailability
of an opposing witness before the witness improves the inherent
reliability of his or her declarations.
When a defendant relinquishes the confrontation right through
procurement, courts should recognize that the government's need for
evidence outweighs the defendant's right to test the reliability of that
evidence.1 2- Although the scale tips in the government's favor, this
balance does not leave reliability concerns unaddressed. The
procuring defendant actually acknowledges the reliability of the
absent witness' information when he or she endeavors to derail the
witness' court appearance-an act the defendant would be less likely
to commit if the witness' information is false or untrustworthy. More
important, the procurement waiver, unlike most hearsay excep-
tions, 124 is not based on a finding of reliability. Rather, it rests on
the need to prevent defendants from profiting through sabotage of
the judicial system.'" Unsworn, ex parte, and extrajudicial state-
ments that demonstrate minimum indicia of reliability, therefore,
should not be excluded from procurement-waiver cases.
1 26
In Black v. Woods 12 and State v. Gettings,28 two cases involving
procurement waivers, the courts did allow admission of such state-
122. See Graham, supra note 8, at 283 (stating that defendant will be less likely to jeopardize
witness if he or she realizes that witness' original statements will be admissible at trial even after
witness becomes unavailable to testify, declines to testify, or changes his or her testimony as
result of intimidation).
123. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (stating that defendant's confrontation
rights may be subordinated to government's interest in law enforcement); Theuis, 665 F.2d at
632-33 (balancing interests of defendant and government in admission of out-of-court statements
in procurement-waiver case and finding that government's interest in obtaining evidence
outweighed defendant's interest).
124. See White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 743 (1992) (indicating that "firmly-rooted" hearsay
exceptions satisfy requirements of Confrontation Clause because they bear sufficient guarantees
of reliability); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (stating that certain hearsay exceptions are based on
foundations of inherent reliability and therefore satisfy constitutional requirements).
125. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for procurement
waiver).
126. But see State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96, 103 (Minn. 1981) (declaring traditional
sentiment against use of unsworn, ex parte evidence at trial because courts consider it inherently
untrustworthy).
127. 651 F.2d 528 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 847 (1981).
128. 769 P.2d 25 (Kan. 1989).
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ments. In Woods, the Eighth Circuit reviewed a decision'29 to admit
two accusatory statements that the defendant's accomplice made to
police before refusing to testify at the murder trial.' The court
found that the defendant had physically abused the accomplice, had
threatened to kill her if she testified against him, and had already
killed another potential witness.' Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit
agreed that the accomplice had a reasonable fear of testifying"'32 and
subsequently affirmed the admission of her unsworn statements under
the procurement-waiver theory.
33
In Gettings, the unavailable witness gave a taped statement to a
police investigator that linked the defendant to incidents of burglary
and arson in which the witness also was involved. 34  The witness,
however, was shot and killed before the defendant's trial.3 5  Pursu-
ant to a finding that the defendant was involved in the shooting, the
Supreme Court of Kansas approved admission of the unsworn
statements against him.1
36
Although the decisions in both Woods and Gettings hinted that
procurement waiver covers admission of unsworn statements made to
criminal investigators, the courts each pointed out that the statements
simultaneously met a hearsay exception, specifically the exception for
statements against interest.'37 The opinions thus dilute the effect
129. State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208 (Minn. 1980), affd sub noam. Black v. Woods, 651 F.2d
528 (8th Cir.), cert. deniA, 454 U.S. 847 (1981).
130. Black v. Woods, 651 F.2d 528, 530-31 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 847 (1981).
131. Id. at 531. At her own trial, the accomplice stated, "I mean, if he'd kill [another
witness] just because she was going to testify against him for a robbery, what was he going to do
to me if I knew about him murdering somebody?" Black, 291 N.W.2d at 214.
132. Woods, 651 F.2d at 531. Procurement-waiver cases have not specified the standard under
which theyjudge the legitimacy of the absent witness' fears. The court in Woods appears to use
an objective standard, justifying the waiver by stating the absent witness' motivation for not
testilying and commenting on the reasonableness of that motivation. See id. (finding that
defendant forfeited confrontation right by pattern of conduct resulting in witness' inability to
testify). But see United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1353 (8th Cir. 1976) (appearing to use
subjective standard by mentioning only intimidated witness' personal reason for not testilying),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
133. Woods, 651 F.2d at 531-32.
134. State v. Gettings, 769 P.2d 25, 27 (Kan. 1989).
135. Id. at 27-28.
136. Id. at 30 (admitting unsworn statements, but noting that jury was given cautionary
instructions that unsworn statements should not be given too much weight if uncorroborated
by other evidence).
137. See Woods, 651 F.2d at531 (stating that absentwitness' statements met "statementagainst
interest" hearsay exception because witness was participant in multiple murder); Cettings, 769
P.2d at 30 (labeling witness' declaration "statement against penal interest because witness
participated in arson with defendant). Statements against interest are an exception to the
hearsay rule under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (3), which provides:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
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of a confrontation waiver, blur the precedential value of their
admission of unsworn statements based on a procurement waiver, and
bring into doubt whether statements beyond prior sworn testimony
would be admissible after procurement if they did not meet additional
hearsay admission requirements. Fortunately, the Second Circuit
recently clarified hearsay admissions under the procurement-waiver
rule in United States v. Aguiar.1
3
1
B. United States v. Aguiar: A Model for Procurement-Waiver
Admissions
In 1992, the Second Circuit in Aguiar came to terms with the
problematic de facto emphasis on admission of prior sworn testimony
in procurement-waiver cases. The case involved a defendant who
appealed his conviction of narcotics possession,13 9 narcotics importa-
tion,' 4° conspiracy,"' and witness tampering. 2  At the trial lev-
el, a key witness, who assisted the defendant in his drug activity,"'
entered into a plea agreement with government agents and, during
ex parte questioning by investigators, confirmed the defendant's
criminal conduct.144 The witness, however, withdrew from his plea
agreement and refused to testify"45 after receiving written and verbal
threats from the defendant. 4 6 The trial court, following a prelimi-
nary evidentiary hearing, admitted the unsworn hearsay statements
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so
far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to
subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the
declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would
not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to
expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not
admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of
the statement.
FED. RL EvID. 804(b) (3).
138. 975 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1992).
139. See United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 46 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a) (1) (1988 & Supp. 1111991)).
140. See id. (citing violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960 (1988 & Supp. m 1991)).
141. See id. (citing violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1988)).
142. See id. (citing violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1111991)).
143. See id. (stating that police arrested witness,just prior to defendant's arrest, while witness
was waiting at airport with heroin for defendant).
144. Id. at 46-47. The witness informed the government that the defendant hired him to
transport heroin from Brussels for use by the defendant, who paid the witness' expenses. Id.
145. Id. at 47 (describing how witness made this decision "even though he was granted
immunity and faced civil and criminal contempt charges" for failing to testify).
146. Id. The defendant sent letters to the witness threatening to tell his fellow prisoners that
he was a government informer and to "expose criminal conduct by the witness, including
murder." Id. The letters also told the witness to falsify his testimony and to have his lawyer
promptly clear the defendant of the charges. Id. In addition, the court noted that the witness
feared for his family's safety. Id.
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made by the witness 47 and convicted the defendant."14
Affirming the conviction, the Second Circuit first reviewed the
procedure for proving procurement, endorsing the use of the less
rigid preponderance of the evidence standard."' Next, the court
addressed the defendant's argument that the jurisdiction's procure-
ment-waiver precedent"5° allowed only for the admission of grand
jury testimony and could not apply to the absent witness' unsworn
statements.15 ' In response, the court held that through his wrongfil
procurement, the defendant waived the right to object to the
admission of the absent witness' out-of-court statements.
52
The defendant next argued that the lower court violated the Due
Process Clause' because the court failed to make further findings
regarding the independent reliability of the statement after it
established that the defendant had waived his confrontation
rights. 54 The court of appeals replied that the jury below received
adequate limiting instructions 55 regarding the statements, and that
the events that took place just prior to the defendant's arrest 56
147. See id. (holding admission of unsworn hearsay statements appropriate where limiting
instructions tojury were given regarding statements); cf. State v. Moore, 622 P.2d 631,632 (Kan.
1981) (expressing concern regarding possible unreliability of accomplice testimony and
suggesting that possible unreliability be offset by cautionary instructions to jury).
148. Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 46.
149. See id. at 47 (noting that when court determines that defendant procured absence of
witness under preponderance of evidence standard, defendant waives Sixth Amendment rights
and hearsay objections because probative value outweighs prejudicial effect). In proving
procurement, the government in Aguiar produced evidence of the witness' fears and the
threatening letters that the defendant sent to him. Id.
150. Id. (citing United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982), which held that
if defendant procured witness' silence, defendant is barred from asserting Confrontation Clause
rights to prevent grand jury testimony of witness from being used as evidence at trial).
151. See id. (stating that defendant in Aguiar attempted to distinguish Mastrangelo because
that case involved sworn grand jury testimony, whereas his case involved unsworn hearsay).
152. Id. (clarifying that Mastrangeo's reasoning is not limited to admission of grand jury
testimony and stating that "[a] defendant who procures a witness's absence waives the right of
confrontation for all purposes with regard to that witness, not just to the admission of sworn
hearsay statements").
153. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
154. Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47. In United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 633 (5th Cir.), cert.
denie4 459 U.S. 825 (1982), the defendant made the same due process objection. The court in
Thevis reaffirmed the constitutionality of admitting unsworn, out-of-court statements by referring
to corroborating evidence. Id. The court found that the corroborating evidence was not "totally
lacking" in reliability, and therefore, the conviction based on such evidence did not violate due
process. Id.
155. See Agu iar, 975 F.2d at 48 (holding that simple, clear, and lengthy burden of proof
instruction by trial courtjudge was sufficient because additional instruction would have confused
issue of "lawful conduct").
156. After the police concealed a recording device on the witness, the witness approached
the defendant in the airport with a bag containing heroin. Id. at 46. The defendant asked if
everything was alright and inquired about the bag. Id. The defendant then took the bag,
whereupon the police arrested him. Id.
1018 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSIY LAW REVIEW
sufficiently corroborated the statements to justify their admission. 57
Aguiar is thus one of the few cases that explicitly addresses the
problem of admitting hearsay statements where a defendant causes
the declaring witness to be unavailable to testify at trial before he or
she makes the statements under oath.
Significantly, the court in Aguiar could have followed the lead of
the Woods and Gettings decisions and bolstered the reliability of the
absent witness' statements by declaring that they were statements
against interest."' 8 The witness did implicate himself in his descrip-
tion of the defendant's crime.159 The fact that the court did not
focus on this issue in its opinion separates this decision from
others160 and strengthens its holding that a waiver by procurement
addresses all of the absent witness' prior statements and notjust those
that simultaneously meet a traditional hearsay exception.
Although the procurement-waiver theory itself does not impose
such extraneous limitations on what kinds of statements become
admissible after a finding of procurement, courts have historically
imposed such limits.' 6' Procurement-waiver decisions have focused
on the absent witness' prior testimony and implied that, despite the
defendant's waiver of his or her confrontation rights and hearsay
objections, the witness' statement is lost absent indicia of reliability
akin to that of traditional hearsay exceptions. 162  United States v.
Aguiar dissolves this shield for the case of procuring defendants and
in so doing presents courts with a guide for the adjudication of
procurement-waiver cases.
157. See id. at 47-48 (finding that both luggage and defendant's threatening letter to witness
sufficiently corroborated witness' testimony). The court explained that admitting unsworn
hearsay might violate due process if the statements are facially unreliable. Id. The court added,
however, that such statements are usually precluded by Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which
states in pertinent part: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury .... " FED. R. EVID. 403. Even when a defendant prevents a witness from
testifying, he or she maintains the right to object to the admission of the witness' hearsay
statements under this rule. Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47; see also Thetis, 665 F.2d at 633 n.17 (testing
admissibility of absent witness' statements in procurement-waiver case under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403).
158. See supra note 137 (discussing admissibility of hearsay understatements against interest
exception in Woods and Gettings).
159. See Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 46 (explaining that witness admitted being hired by defendant
to smuggle heroin into United States).
160. See supra notes 127-37 and accompanying text (discussing opinions that have applied
"statements against interest" hearsay exception in procurement-waiver decisions).
161. See discussion supra part III.A (discussing need for indicia of reliability, despite waiver
of confrontation rights, if hearsay is to be admissible).
162. See, e.g., Black v. Woods, 651 F.2d 528, 531 (discussing need for reliability to meet
requirement of Confrontation Clause); State v. Gettings, 769 P.2d 25, 29-30 (asserting that
statement against penal interest with corroboration meets reliability requirement).
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IV. RECOMMENDATION
Neither the courts nor the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits the
admission of unsworn, ex parte, or extrajudicial statements after a
finding of procurement. The problem is that courts, in their
procurement-waiver decisions, have not squarely addressed this
issue."' Although Aguiar demonstrates that a court may implement
the common-law procurement waiver toward such declarations, the
clearest and most effective solution would be congressional codifica-
tion of Aguiar in the form of an amendment to the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Specifically, Congress should create a new exception to the
hearsay rule based on a procurement waiver." The creation of a
new exception would generate uniform treatment of procurement
waivers" and would prevent courts from resorting to less appropri-
ate rules regarding admission of the absent witness' statements."
The rule would establish a low threshold admissibility test based
primarily on the corroboration of applicable statements.1 67 The
court would apply the exception when a defendant objected to the
admission of an absent witness' declarations and when the govern-
ment claimed the procurement-waiver exception. Under the
proposed rule, the presiding judge would then require the govern-
163. See supra notes 109-37 and accompanying text (discussing failure of courts that have
confronted defendant procurement cases to admit evidence based on procurement-waiver rule).
164. Rule 804(b), which contains the hearsay exceptions for situations in which the declarant
is unavailable, FED. R. EVID. 804(b), would be an appropriate place for Congress to insert this
new exception. An aspect of the defendant-procurement exception that would distinguish it
from the others, however, is its narrow prerequisite that the defendant advance the conditions
that cause the declarant's unavailability. See FED. RL EvID. 804(a) (listing diverse conditions
under which declarant is defined as "unavailable" for purpose of existing unavailability
exceptions of rule 804(b)).
There is another possible location for a defendant-procurement rule. Because the rule takes
part of its justification from the assumption that the procuring defendant acted to prevent
disclosure of truthful information, one could say that the defendant thus adopted the absent
witness' statement as true. A defendant-procurement provision would fit, therefore, under the
"adoptive admissions" subsection of rule 801 (d) (2). See FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (2) (B) (excluding
from definition of"hearsay" statement of which defendant"has manifested an adoption or belief
in its truth"). A defendant-procurement rule in this position would cause the absent witness'
statements to be admitted as nonhearsay rather than as an exception to the hearsay rule.
165. The extent to which anew federal rule would provide uniformity in procurement-waiver
situations, of course, would depend on whether states follow the federal example as they have
in the past. See Lilly, supra note 29, at xxv (listing 31 states that have based their evidentiary
rules on Federal Rules of Evidence).
166. See supra notes 127-37 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have applied
"statements against interest" exception in procurement-waiver situations).
167. Courts, other than the Second Circuit in Aguiar, have relied on corroborative evidence
for trustworthiness in procurement-waiver cases. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616,
633 (5th Cir.) (finding that witness' testimony was sufficiently corroborated by other evidence),
cet. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); State v. Gettings, 769 P.2d 25, 30 (Kan. 1989) ("Other testimony
corroborated parts of (the absent witness'] statement.").
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ment to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, 168 the
defendant's involvement in preventing the witness from testifying at
trial. Where the court finds wrongful procurement, the rule would
require the court to reject the defendant's Confrontation Clause or
hearsay rule objections regarding admission of any of the absent
witness' relevant out-of-court statements. 169 The rule would protect
the defendant's remaining due process rights by directing the court
to suppress those statements that are uncorroborated or facially
unreliable.""0 Furthermore, as with all proffered evidence, the court
would admit the statements only if their probative value outweighed
their prejudicial effect.' If the statements pass these tests, they
would become admissible under the federal rules. The court should
then instruct the jury regarding hearsay and unsworn statements1
2
and leave the determination of reliability to its judgment.
Congressional enactment of a procurement-waiver rule that moves
away from the traditional emphasis on sworn testimony would not
incite the prosecution to introduce a stampede of insidious statements
to the jury. Instead, the new standard would ensure that the available
evidence corroborates the hearsay before allowing the common-law
procurement-waiver rule to reach its end result-the defendant's
inability to raise hearsay or Confrontation Clause objections regarding
any of the absent witness' statements. The defendant would, however,
retain the traditional rights to object on other grounds, offer evidence
to impeach the credibility of the absent witness,"' cross-examine the
person who took the statements,"v4 and attack the reliability of the
absent witness' statements during closing arguments.
The most effective response to the recurring problem of defendant
168. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text (discussing rationale behind choosing
preponderance of evidence standard for proving procurement).
169. See United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 46 (2d Cir. 1992) (specifying that procurement
waivers apply to all declarations of unavailable witness).
170. See supra note 157 (describing Aguia's concern with due process after finding of
procurement waiver).
171. See supra note 157 (discussing probative-prejudicial balancing test of rule 403).
172. The court in State v. Gettings, faced with a procurement-waiver admission of an
accomplice's unsworn statements, instructed the jury as follows:
A person who is in the company of the defendant when such defendant is alleged to
have committed a crime may identify such defendant as the person who committed the
crime. However, you should consider with caution an unsworn statement made by
such person if such unsworn statement is not supported by other evidence and such
person is arrested and interrogated concerning such crime.
State v. Gettings, 769 P.2d 25, 30 (Kan. 1989).
173. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 n.14 (5th Cir.) (noting that defendant
may still cross-examine witnesses regarding credibility of their testimony), cert. denied 459 U.S.
825 (1982).
174. See Gettings, 769 P.2d at 30 (approving of defendant's ability to cross-examine officer
who took absent witness' statements).
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procurement is to admit any statement that would have been
admissible had the defendant permitted the witness to testify.175
Congressional enactment of an appropriate rule of evidence based on
Aguiar's format would promote this response and ensure that, unless
the statements are "so totally lacking in reliability that a conviction
would violate due process, " 176 courts do not become distracted by
the unsworn status of relevant evidence. A defendant's participation
in the intimidation or murder of a witness before the witness'
statements could reach sworn status in itself serves as testament to the
reliability of the witness' information.
CONCLUSION
The Confrontation Clause and the rule against hearsay protect the
accused from untrustworthy accusations, primarily by ensuring that
the accused has a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. When the
government proves that a defendant deliberately prevented such a
witness from appearing at trial, the law mandates that the defendant
has waived his right to object to admission of the witness' out-of-court
statements. Courts, however, have concentrated on the absent
witness' prior sworn testimony in applying this rule, leaving scarce
precedent for situations where the defendant forces a witness,
through intimidation or murder, into silence after having made only
unsworn, ex parte, extrajudicial statements. If these declarations,
from that point forward, are "inherently untrustworthy," the defen-
dant, by purposefully dismantling the law's truth-seeking mechanism,
is responsible and, in effect, assumed the attached risks.
To prevent a defendant who has procured the unavailability of a
witness from benefiting from the misdeed, Congress should adopt a
new exception to the hearsay rule based on a procurement waiver.
If a court determines that the absent witness' statements have minimal
indicia of reliability, then the witness' relevant statements should be
admitted, regardless of whether he or she made them during a grand
jury proceeding or during police questioning. Such a rule appropri-
ately would create difficulty for the defense, rather than for the
prosecution, once the defendant prevents a prosecution witness from
testifying.
175. See Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating that in case of
procurement, witness' prior statements are admissible if such statements would have been
admissible had witness been available to testify at trial), cert. denied sub no=. Kilbane v. Marshall,
460 U.S. 1053 (1983).
176. Theois, 665 F.2d at 633.
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